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IN THE ‘ERA OF MIGHT AND HAPPINESS’, 
WILL THE TRANS-CASPIAN PIPELINE 





Reliable and effective transboundary transportation networks for energy 
resources are vital for economic development and security. Having acquired 
sovereignty after the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan sought to assert their independence through constructing 
transportation networks with their neighbours. By actively cooperating with 
international oil companies (‘IOC’) to jointly develop major upstream 
projects and regional cross-border oil and gas pipelines, Azerbaijan has 
been the most successful in transporting its oil and gas to regional and 
international markets.
1
 In the 1990s, Azerbaijan strayed from Russia’s iron 
grip and together with several IOCs commenced developing its Azeri-
Chirag-Gunashli oil fields. Then in 2006, the IOCs finished construction of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (‘BTC’) pipeline to transport Azeri oil from the 
Caspian to the Mediterranean.
2
  
                                                                                                             
 * LLB La Trobe University. LL.M. University of Melbourne. The author thanks 
Professor Owen Anderson, Senior Fellow, University of Melbourne, for providing 
comments on a draft of this article. 
 1. Nurlan Mustafayev, Production Sharing Agreements in the Petroleum Industry of 
Azerbaijan 8 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 362, 362 (2015). 
 2. The Contract of the Century – a National Strategy for Success, BP Azerbaijan 
(2019), <https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/acg2/ 
the-contract-of-the-century---a-national-strategy-for-success.html?fbclid=IwAR1vCa1S0u 
Ok_wtj92BArkCr67EbfZKwnytoG3eCW88njpf94RC-N8a3jWo>; Agreement on the Joint 
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Turkmenistan has not achieved the same level of success. The Trans-
Caspian Pipeline (‘TCP’) was first proposed in 1996
3
 to transport Turkmen 
natural gas along the Caspian seabed to Azerbaijan and on to European 
markets.
4
 However, the TCP has become the geopolitical battleground for 
various issues within Central Asia over the past few decades, and unlike the 
BTC, it has not been built. With the global economy in a tailspin as a result 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and oil and gas prices fluctuating between 
historic lows, the prospects of completing the project have been doubted.
5
 
Nevertheless, now is, in fact, the perfect time to turn this pipedream into a 
reality. 
This article explores how the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the 
Caspian Sea’s (‘Convention’) newly eased approval mechanism for laying 
submarine pipelines has provided much-needed legal certainty that could 
foster completion of the TCP.
6
 It argues that while Russian opposition casts 
doubt over the prospects of success, this is eroded by Europe’s strategic 
interests and financial commitment to the project.
7
 Turkmenistan’s ‘Era of 
Might and Happiness’, typified by a desire to diversify its gas export routes, 
is then considered against difficulties that emanate from its authoritarian 
regime and foreign policies.
8
 It is contended that while the State restricts 
                                                                                                             
Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep Water 
Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea, BP (1994), 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/country-sites/en_az/azerbaijan/home/pdfs/legalagree 
ments/psas/ea-az-restated-acg-psa.pdf.  
 3. S. Rob Sobhani, Opinion, A Boost to Global Energy Security, The Washington 
Times, Jun. 24, 2019, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/24/why-the-trans-
caspian-pipeline-must-become-one-of-/>. 
 4. See Figure 1.  
 5. Daniel D. Stein, Trans-Caspian Pipeline – Still a Pipe Dream?, Atlantic Council 
(2020) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/trans-caspian-pipeline-still-a-
pipe-dream/>.  
 6. Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (Aktau, 12 August 2018, not yet 
in force), available at http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5328 (‘Convention’). 
 7. Matthew Bryza, Robert M. Cutler, and Giorgi Vashakmadze, US Foreign Policy 
and Euro-Caspian Energy Security: The Time is Now to Build the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, 
Atlantic Council (2020) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/us-foreign-
policy-and-euro-caspian-energy-security-the-time-is-now-to-build-the-trans-caspian-
pipeline/>. 
 8. ‘President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, Ministry of Energy of 
Turkmenistan (2020) <http://minenergo.gov.tm/en>. See, Turkmenistan President 
Berdymukhamedov Reappears After Death Rumours, British Broadcasting Corp. (2019) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49319380>.ˆ See also, Marika Karagianni, 
Turkmenistan Looks to Gas Expansion, Petroleum Economist (2019) <https://www. 
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foreign investment into its energy market, this will not be fatal to the TCP. 
Ultimately the questions that arise from this article are: will the Convention 
and the EU’s quest for diverse gas imports bring about the completion of 
the TCP? Or, will Russia’s opposition, together with Turkmenistan’s own 
foreign investment policies, defeat it?  
 

















II. The Convention and its Impact on the TCP 
On 12 August 2018, after more than twenty years of negotiations, the 
leaders of the five littoral States to the Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – finally signed a treaty to define its 
legal status. The Convention created a new legal order in the region for 
laying submarine pipelines and will likely have a major impact on the 
TCP’s development. Before exploring this, the prior legal uncertainty 
concerning the status of the waters is outlined to highlight how it prevented 
many of the littoral States from exporting petroleum products along the 
Caspian seabed and on to other markets.  
  
                                                                                                             
petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-east/2019/turkmenistan-looks-
to-gas-expansion>. 
 9. Mitsui & Co., European Union Keen on Trans-Caspian Pipeline Development – 
Improvement of Relations With Russia and Turkey a Key Hurdle (2019) 
<https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/en/report/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/01/31/1911e_fuhr
mann_e.pdf>. 
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A. Background to the Convention and the Caspian’s New Legal Status 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea was governed 
by Russia from the north and Iran from the south through several bilateral 
treaties that were concluded in the first part of the twentieth century.
10
 They 
established that the Caspian Sea was jointly shared and closed to third 
parties, however, were silent on the question of petroleum distribution and 
exportation. Throughout this period, shared use heavily favoured the 
powerful and formidable Soviet Union, who enjoyed regional hegemony. 
Then, when the Soviet Red Flag was lowered down the Kremlin flagpole on 
25 December 1991, three newly sovereign littoral States were born: 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
11
 Each wanted a share in the 
Caspian’s petroleum deposits and the right to export them via submarine 
pipelines along the seabed via their own transportation networks. However, 
the States could not agree to a legal status that would enable a division of 
the Caspian waters.  
The international legal status of a body of water is important because it 
helps determine which portions fall within or outside the scope of a littoral 
State’s sovereign rights and obligations. This includes the right to exploit 
certain portions of the seabed, as well as the right to lay submarine 
pipelines for distributing petroleum products.
12
 Over the course of 
negotiating the legal status of the Caspian Sea, States such as Turkmenistan 
favoured developing a legal regime for the Caspian waters under the 
auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(‘UNCLOS’).
13
 If UNCLOS applied, the Caspian basin would have been 
legally classified as a ‘sea’.
14
 The provisions of UNCLOS would have 
                                                                                                             
 10. Treaty of Friendship, Russia–Persia, signed 26 February 1921, 9 LNTS 383 (entered 
into force 7 June 1921) (‘Treaty of Friendship’); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, 
Russia-Persia, 144 British and Foreign State Papers 419 (1940–42) (signed and entered into 
force 25 March 1940) (‘Treaty of Commerce and Navigation’). 
 11. David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945, 575 (Penguin, 
2000). 
 12. Elena Karataeva, The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: The Final 
Answer or an Interim Solution to the Caspian Question? 35 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 232, 255 (2020). 
 13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 
December 1982, 1835 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’) 
available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= 
XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en; See, Jiao Yiqiang, ‘The Signing of the 
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Implications’ (2019) 75 China 
International Studies 178, 178-179. 
 14. See supra note 13. 
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guided delimitation of maritime zones
15
 and adjacent boundaries, resource 
development, and the right to build infrastructure. Other States such as Iran 
considered the Caspian Sea to be a ‘shared lake’, subject to customary 
international law and unanimous consent.
16
 There is no uniform State 
practice for lake utilisation and the methods of boundary delimitation.
17
 
Although, Iran had suggested an equal division of the Caspian Sea between 
the five littoral States, with each having a 20 per cent share under its 
control.
18
 Given the littoral States could not agree to one of these legal 
regimes, the Caspian littoral States obstructed development of the necessary 
underwater infrastructure to export oil and gas to foreign markets.
19
  
Notwithstanding the divergent legal approaches toward division of the 
Caspian Sea, which at times culminated in military stand-offs bubbling to 
the surface, the littoral States signed the Convention at the Fifth Caspian 
Summit in Aktau, Kazakhstan in 2018.
20
 Russian leader Vladimir Putin 
hailed the event as “truly epoch making” and diplomats labelled the 
document as a regional constitution.
21
 Today, Iran's Majles is the only 
parliament that has not yet ratified the Convention.
22
 Through the 
Convention, the littoral States agreed to a sui generis regime by defining 
the Caspian Sea as a ‘body of water’.
23
 As such, neither UNCLOS nor 
                                                                                                             
 15. Maritime zones under UNCLOS: Territorial Sea 12 nautical miles, Contiguous Zone 
12 nautical miles, Exclusive Economic Zone 200 nautical miles, Continental Shelf, High 
Seas. 
 16. Yiqiang, supra note 13, at 181; as will be explored later in this article, so too did 
Turkmenistan at varying intervals. 
 17. Mariangela Gramola, State Succession and the Delimitation of the Caspian Sea in 
Benedetto Conforti et al (eds), Italian Yearbook of International Law vol 14, 237-272, 239 
(Brill, 2004); See, Affairs du lac Lanoux (Spain v. France) (Awards) (1957) 12 RIAA 281, 
281. 
 18. Iran has the shortest Caspian Sea coastline, and therefore favoured this mechanism 
of division because it would enable Iran to have a greater share of the sea space. 
 19. Pierre Thévenin, The Caspian Convention: New Status but Old Divisions? 44 
Review of Central and East European Law 437, 443 (2019); See, Andrey G. Kostianoy et al, 
‘Geographic Characteristics of the Black-Caspian Seas Region’ in Sergey S. Zhiltsov, Igor 
S. Zonn and Andrey G. Kostianoy (eds), Oil and Gas Pipelines in the Black-Caspian Seas 
Region, 8 (Springer, 2016). 
 20. Karataeva, supra note 12, at 255. 
 21. Phoebe Greenwood, Landmark Caspian Sea Deal Signed by Five Coastal Nations, 
The Guardian (online, 12 August 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2018/aug/12/landmark-caspian-sea-deal-signed-among-five-coastal-nations>.  
 22. Joseph Murray, Russia Ratifies Caspian Convention, Natural Gas World (2019) 
<https://www.naturalgasworld.com/russia-ratifies-caspian-convention-73460>. 
 23. Convention, supra note 6, at art 1. 
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customary international law concerning lakes apply to the governance of 
the waters. Although similar to UNCLOS, the Caspian Sea is now divided 
into different maritime zones. Each littoral State now has exclusive control 
over an area extending up to 15 nautical miles from its shores for mineral 
and energy exploration, known as the territorial waters, and a further ten 
miles for fishing.
24
 The area beyond is shared jointly,
25
 and questions on 
delimitation for each maritime zone are to be settled through further 






























                                                                                                             
 24. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 6, 7 and 9. See, Figure 2. 
 25. Convention, supra note 6, at art 3.  
 26. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 7(1) and 9(1); See Karataeva, supra note 12, at 261. 
 27. The Caspian Summit, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Infographic, 13 August 
2018) <https://www.rferl.org/a/the-caspian-summit/29430597.html>. 
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B. The Convention’s Regime on Submarine Pipelines: New Hope for the 
TCP 
Among the Convention’s greatest achievements is the less onerous 
approval regime for laying submarine pipelines. This will enhance the 
prospects of the TCP being built if the littoral States implement the relevant 
provisions in good faith. Article 14(1) of the Convention provides that each 
littoral State may construct submarine pipelines on the seabed of the 
Caspian Sea. The route must be determined by agreement between the 
laying State and any other State whose seabed sector the pipeline will 
traverse.
28
 Article 14 is similar to Articles 58 and 79 of UNCLOS, which 
allows States to lay submarine pipelines within a coastal State’s exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf, subject to the consent of the 
respective coastal State.
29
 Despite the clarity offered through Article 14, the 
Convention is silent on what factors may or may not lead to granting 
approvals for the routing of pipelines. Further, it is not clear whether private 
sector entities themselves may apply for, or benefit from, an agreement 
reached under Article 14(3).
30
 
Nevertheless, the fact that this new approval regime exists at all is 
significant. In the post-Soviet era Russia rejected the application of 
UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea,
31
 partly because it opposed the construction 
of any new pipelines along the seabed beyond its territorial waters without 
its approval, something that would have been permissible under UNCLOS. 
Russia’s position was likely owing to its desire to maintain a degree of 
control over the transfer of oil and gas to Europe, given it owns the major 
transportation networks for petroleum products in the region. Russia 
consistently held this position during negotiations for the Convention, and 
with Iran, sought to subject the development of pipelines to approval by all 
littoral States.
32
 Even though it is not a party to UNCLOS, Turkmenistan 
opposed this by expressing its desire for UNCLOS to apply to the waters, 
                                                                                                             
 28. Convention, supra note 6, at art 14(1)-(3); See, Norton Rose Fulbright, The 
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea - A sea or not a sea: that is still the 




 29. UNCLOS, supra note 13, at arts 58 and 79. 
 30. Norton Rose Fulbright, supra note 28.  
 31. Thévenin, supra note 19, at 443.  
 32. Andrei Kazanstev, Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region 
60(6) Europe-Asia Studies 1073, 1085 (2008). 
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and by extension, its applicable approval mechanisms for submarine 
pipelines.
33
 Despite Russia’s opposition, Turkmenistan succeeded in 
including Article 14 of the Convention, which as identified above, contains 
a similar approval mechanism for the laying of submarine pipelines to that 
which is contained within UNCLOS.  
Turkmenistan’s victory over this major global power begs the question: 
why did Russia agree to forgo any veto power to approve or deny the laying 
of submarine pipelines in areas beyond its territorial waters? It appears that 
a mutually beneficial compromise was reached, whereby Russia traded the 
approval right in exchange for restricting navigation in the Caspian Sea and 
monitoring security developments. Article 3(11) of the Convention restricts 
navigation in, entry to and exit from the Caspian Sea to ships flying the flag 
of one of the littoral States.
34
 Commercial ships can also access ports and 
port facilities when flying the flags of the contracting States, thus entitling 
them to enjoy the same treatment as national ships of the party in whose 
territory the port is located.
35
 This is consistent with the Soviet-Iranian 




Where the Convention goes further than the previous legal model is in its 
regulation of the navigation of warships, submarines and other underwater 
vessels.
37
 Article 3(6) expressly prohibits the presence of armed forces not 
belonging to any of the five littoral States. Russia has persistently stressed 
the importance of security in the region, especially given its concern of 
being encircled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (‘NATO’) and by 
extension, the United States (‘US’).
38
 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council only months 
after the Soviet Union collapsed,
39
 and each receive substantial aid from the 
                                                                                                             
 33. See UNCLOS, supra note 13. 
 34. Convention, supra note 6, at art 3(11).  
 35. Convention, supra note 6, at art 10(2).  
 36. Karataeva, supra note 12, at 244-245, Treaty of Friendship, Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation.  
 37. Daniel Müller and Ketavan Betaneli, The New Convention on the Legal Status of the 
Caspian Sea: New Opportunities and New Challenges, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (1 
November 2018) <http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/Global/r/3848/the_new_convention_ 
on_the_legal_status_of_the_caspian_sea>. 
 38. Thévenin, supra note 19, at 460. 
 39. Elkhan Mekhtiev, Security Policy in Azerbaijan, NATO (2001) 
<https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/mekhtiev.pdf>; Relations with Turkmenistan, 
NATO (28 September 2018) <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50317.htm>; 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss4/6





 Along with Iran, Russia has viewed this as a both a 
provocation and direct threat to regional security that must be quashed.
41
 
With the new express exclusion of foreign vessels, NATO or the US will 
not be able to deploy its ships or troops in the Caspian Sea via Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, which is a major security triumph for Russia. 
Further, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla, which lies ready to strike, now sits 
unperturbed due to the absence of any nearby foreign vessels that may 
block its missile attacks,
42
 serving Russia’s Middle Eastern security 
strategy.  
Finally, to preserve their post-Soviet autonomy, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan have hastened to develop their own national navies. This 
militarisation of the Caspian Sea responds to several threats, such as 
avoiding Russian, and to a lesser extent, Iranian domination, and protecting 
existing and future maritime energy corridors.
43
 Because of the foreign aid 
provided by NATO and the US, Russia has sought to consolidate its 
hegemonic security position through checks on the navies of Caspian 
littoral States. On this basis, Russia succeeded in having incorporated into 
the Convention Articles 3(3) and 3(4), which ensure a stable balance of 
armaments of the littoral States, whereby they can only develop military 
capabilities within the limits of ‘reasonable sufficiency with due regard to 
the interests of all the [littoral States] and without prejudice to the security 
of each other’.
44
 Even though Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan attained the 
unilateral right to construct submarine pipelines in their sovereign maritime 
zones, this security trade off may, in the future, prove cumbersome.  
  
                                                                                                             
Relations with Kazakhstan, NATO (26 March 2019) <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
topics_49598.htm>. 
 40. Thévenin supra note 19, at 459; Sebastian Engels, Military Professionalisation 
Programs in Kazakhstan and the United States: How to Implement and What Will We Gain? 
2 Connections: The Quarterly Journal 91, 91-104 (2017); Joshua Kucera, Azerbaijan Has 
Advantage Over Armenia In U.S. Military Aid, Eurasianet (17 May 2016) 
<https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-has-advantage-over-armenia-us-military-aid?fbclid=IwA 
R2WeO7358xccHaCYLn5T-91wxZEqVWspXhd57aV3NFQ9QMp4bqmm5gf7qs>. 
 41. Thévenin, supra note 19, at 459.  
 42. Yiqiang, supra note 13, at 187; See Russian Missiles ‘Hit IS in Syria from Caspian 
Sea’, BBC (7 October 2015) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34465425>. 
 43. Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, The Militarization of the Caspian Sea: 
“Great Games” and “Small Games” Over the Caspian Fleets, China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly 7/2 (2009) 17, 28. 
 44. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 3(3), 3(4).  
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C. Environmental Objection to the TCP 
The new environmental provisions within the Convention suggest that 
Russia has not entirely eroded its ability to obstruct the TCP. However, this 
is limited by gaps within the Convention, as well as the EU’s interest in 
finalising the TCP. Article 14(2) of the Convention stipulates that 
submarine pipeline projects must comply with environmental standards 
embodied within international agreements, such as the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the C1aspian 
Sea (‘Tehran Convention’) and its relevant protocols.
45
  
Concern presently exists over whether Russia, alongside Iran, will shape 
their long-standing opposition to the TCP through the guise of 
environmental concern, by utilising this environmental protection 
mechanism contained within Article 14(2) of the Convention. This is 
supported by past statements the two have made. At the 2019 Caspian 
Economic Forum which took place in Avaza, Turkmenistan, Behrouz 
Namdari, of Iran’s National Gas Company said, “Iran is against any trans-
Caspian pipelines.”
46
 He suggested that any party seeking to transport gas 
from the eastern border of the Caspian Sea to the western border should 
deliver it through Iran’s pipeline network. At that time, the then current 
Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, who was also at the Economic 
Forum, said he was “absolutely convinced that all major projects in the 
Caspian Sea should undergo a thorough and impartial environmental 
evaluation involving specialists from all Caspian countries.” Medvedev’s 
statement is consistent with Article 17 of the Tehran Convention, which 
allows each littoral State to introduce and apply procedures of 
environmental impact assessment for any planned activity that is likely to 
cause a significant adverse effect on the marine wildlife environment of the 
Caspian Sea.
47
 While this requirement has the potential to be used as a 
delaying tactic, Article 17(3) of the Tehran Convention requires the parties 
to cooperate with one another, as does Article 3(1) of the Convention.  
Moreover, there are two key gaps within the Convention that render the 
impact of any environmental objection uncertain. First, Article 14(2) does 
not specify what is to occur when one of the littoral States does not comply 
                                                                                                             
 45. Convention, supra note 6, at art 14(2). 
 46. Bruce Pannier, ‘Russia, Iran Cite 'Ecological Concerns' In Opposing Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (15 August 2019) <https://www.rferl.org/ 
a/russia-iran-trans-caspian-pipeline-turkmenistan/30111805.html>. 
 47. The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Caspian Sea, opened for signature November 2003, (entered into force 12 August 2006) art 
17.  
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with the condition that their projects conform to environmental standards – 
nor does any other provision within the Convention. Second, Article 21 of 
the Convention provides that disagreements and disputes, regarding 
interpretation of the application of the Convention, shall be settled through 
consultations and negotiations between the littoral States.
48
 If these 
consultations and negotiations fail, recourse may be obtained through 
international law.
49
 This dispute resolution mechanism is vague, and the 
Convention does not contain provisions for judicial or quasi-judicial 
review. Accordingly, fully understanding the impact of any environmental 
objections to the TCP will remain unclear until these provisions are tested 
in a legal forum, and until then, their potential legal effect should not be 
overstated.  
D. Can the European Union’s Interest in the TCP Stem the Tide Against 
Russia’s Opposition to the Project? 
Diversification and security of energy supply is at the heart of the 
European Union’s (‘EU’) gas policy.
50
 When Russia’s gas flow to Ukraine 
ceased in 2006, as well as on numerous occasions thereafter,
51
 it dawned on 
the EU and other European States just how susceptible they were to Russian 
supply shortages.
52
 For instance, Germany, Austria, and Slovakia 
experienced a 33 per cent shortfall in their gas supply, leaving millions of 
people to face a bitterly cold winter.
53
 Approximately 40 per cent of natural 
gas imports to the EU come from Russia, and given Russia’s propensity to 
‘turn off the taps’, the EU has resolved to diversify and expand its gas 
                                                                                                             
 48. Convention, supra note 6, at art 21(1). 
 49. Convention, supra note 6, at art 21(2). 
 50. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7 
February 1992, [2009] OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993), available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT, Article 
194; Energy Supply and Energy Security, European Parliament (Briefing, July 2016) 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/briefing_energy_supply_security.pdf>.  
 51. Russia also ceased gas supply to Ukraine in 2009 and 2014. See Moniek de Jong et 
al., A Matter of Preference: Taking Sides on the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline Project, 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies (8 December 2020), 1 <https://www. 
tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14782804.2020.1858763?needAccess=true>. 
 52. Friedbert Pflüger, A European View: Europe, Nord Stream 2, and Diversification, 
Atlantic Council (15 March 2019) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/a-
european-view-europe-nord-stream-2-and-diversification/>. 
 53. Angela E. Stent, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (Twelve, 
2019), 76.  
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supply routes and sources.
54
 As part of this strategy, the European 
Commission deemed it necessary to build a Southern Gas Corridor (‘SGC’) 
linking the EU with the gas fields of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through 
Turkey. December 2020 marked the first time in history that gas from 
Azerbaijan was transported directly through pipelines on to European 
markets,
55
 resulting in yet another success story for Azerbaijan. However, 
the TCP presently remains the ‘missing link’
56
 that would enable the EU to 
bring the SGC to completion. On this basis, the EU’s interest in the TCP 
represents a strong opportunity to advance completion of the project and 
bulwark Russia’s environmental opposition. 
The EU’s interest in realising the TCP is demonstrated by its political 
and commercial commitments. Practical movements were first made in 
2011, when the EU initiated negotiations with Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan for construction of the TCP.
57
 Just two weeks after the Caspian 
Convention was signed in 2018, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
visited Azerbaijan to discuss the SGC and expressed clear interest in 
advancing development of the TCP.
58
 Emphasis on the TCP’s potential to 
diversify EU gas supply sources was also expressed in a statement by the 
German Federal Foreign Office two months after Merkel’s visit.
59
 Since 
2013, the economic potential of the TCP has been included in every 
European Commission Project of Common Interest list.
60
 Projects on this 
list are eligible to receive public funds and are deemed a key priority for 
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Europe’s energy system infrastructure; thus, the TCP’s inclusion signals the 
EU’s commercial commitment.  
The project has also been advanced on the engineering, economical, and 
environmental front. In 2017, through the Connecting Europe Facility of the 
European Commission, the EU agreed to a grant of up to €1,871,725 for the 
pre-Front-End Engineering Design (‘pre-FEED’) of the project, to be 
carried out between 2018 and 2020.
61
 The purpose of a pre-FEED survey is 
to confirm the technical and economic feasibility of a project. As of March 
2021, the status of the pre-FEED surveys is ‘ongoing’
62
 and depending on 
the results, a process of consultation and design will likely follow. The 
World Bank and the European Commission also executed a comprehensive 
environmental scoping for the TCP in 2015, wherein it was concluded that 
there were no major environmental concerns. In the event that issues may 
arise, industry best practices would likely offer a solution, thus 
circumventing Russia’s ability to rely on the environmental provisions of 
the Caspian Convention as a means to obstruct development of the TCP.
63
  
Funding aside, legitimate concern has been expressed about the capacity 
of the SGC to receive gas from Turkmenistan.
64
 The SGC begins in 
Azerbaijan and links seven States before ending in Italy. It consists of three 
interconnected gas pipelines, being the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-
Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (‘TANAP’), and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(‘TAP’).
65
 At ‘plateau’, the SGC is expected to deliver up to sixteen billion 
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cubic metres per annum of natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas 
field to consumers in Southeast Europe.
66
 Now if the TCP were built with a 
capacity to move 30 billion cubic metres of gas, Turkmenistan would need 
to install compressors at the East-West pipeline that connects its large fields 
with the Caspian Sea.
67
 Then, the capacity of both TANAP and TAP would 
need to be expanded to accommodate increased gas flow.
68
 While this 
would be a costly endeavour, the CEO of the TANAP operating company, 
Saltuk Duzyol, said in January 2021 that “any expansion of the pipeline 
would happen only if gas were available at one end the pipeline and a 
market for the gas existed at the other”.
69
 Given the EU’s listing of the TCP 
as a priority project, and its continued resolve to diversify its gas supply 
routes and sources, the market does appear to exist. Further, since 
commercial gas deliveries to Europe from Azerbaijan have commenced via 
TAP, satisfying the first market test for the pipeline, the EU’s appetite for 
expansion to accommodate the TCP remains strong. The president of the 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic, Rovnag Abdullayev, has also 




Germany’s ongoing commitment to Nord Stream 2 (‘NS2’) may also 
encourage Russia to abandon its opposition to the TCP.
71
 As explored 
above, Russia’s decision to cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine,
72
 which 
flows own to European markets, sparked an urgent move by the EU to 
diversify its gas supply routes and sources. Simultaneously, Russia now 
wants to eliminate Ukraine as a transit State through construction of NS2, 
which will deliver gas across the Baltic Sea directly to Germany. However, 
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the $11 billion pipeline that is 90 per cent complete
73
 has been an 
enormously polarising project within the EU, owing to fears that the EU has 
become too dependent on Russian gas.
74
 The US has also imposed 
sanctions on NS2 affiliated companies in attempts to halt the project, 
calling it a “bad deal for Europe” that “undermines basic EU principles in 
terms of energy security and energy independence”.
75
 Nevertheless, Russia 
and Germany, along with other EU member States, remain committed to 
the project. Given the TCP is of strategic interest to the US,
76
 a compromise 
may be possible, whereby the US and EU could agree to development of 
NS2 in exchange for Russia backing down from its opposition to the TCP. 
Considering the political and commercial trends that have been 
progressed by the EU, it is unlikely that Russia’s environmental opposition 
to the TCP will succeed. The wheels are in motion for accelerating 
construction, and it seems unlikely the EU would abandon the project after 
making significant political and financial contributions to the pre-FEED 
phase of the TCP, and the SGC. 
III. Authoritarianism and Gas Diversification – Can the Two 
Co-Exist to Bring About the TCP? 
The authoritarian political system in Turkmenistan and its respective gas 
policies may be a barrier to completion of the TCP. Turkmenistan has 
solidified a firm reputation as one of the twenty-first century’s most 
capriciously corrupt and repressive political regimes.
77
 Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the first post-independence President, 
Saparmurat Niyazov, cultivated an atomised and isolationist Turkmen 
society, whilst consolidating a centralist political regime based on fear, 
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 As the successor since 2007, President Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedow (‘PGB’), has followed in Niyazov’s footsteps and has 
instituted a fervent cult of personality, cemented by a gilded six-metre-high 
statue of the leader on horseback perched on a white cliff.
79
 It is this style of 
government that underwrites decisions relating to the State’s energy policy.  
Despite exact figures being hidden behind a wall of secrecy, 
Turkmenistan holds the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, 
having an estimated holding of 71 billion tons.
80
 With natural gas as its 
largest export, this means that the political and economic fate of 
Turkmenistan is deeply connected to its hydrocarbon deposits and the 
ability to export them to markets across the globe. When re-elected in 2012, 
PGB labelled his ongoing presidency as an ‘Era of Might and Happiness’, 
to be typified by an uninterrupted and reliable supply of energy to a diverse 
range of foreign consumers.
81
 Indeed, PGB regularly announces his desire 
to attract foreign investment toward the Turkmen oil and gas sector.
82
 
Foreign investment is undeniably a necessary ingredient for developing the 
TCP, for an IOC could take on the financial risks Turkmenistan could not 
bear alone on such a major project.
83
 However, the Turkmen government 
prohibits foreign investment in onshore gas production and refuses to grant 
foreign buyers equity stakes in its upstream fields. 
Upstream natural gas operations involving foreign investors are 
governed in Turkmenistan by Production Sharing Contracts (‘PSC’). 
Turkmengaz, the State-run natural gas company, presently owns 100 per 
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cent of all onshore gas projects and the State normally takes a carried 20-50 
percent stake.
84
 Turkmenistan’s energy policy dictates that IOCs contribute 
to PSCs on a service-basis only, and this must be done in partnership with 
Turkmengaz.
85
 When an IOC agrees to participate solely on a service-basis, 
it agrees to perform certain specified activities for the host government in 
return for a fixed payment.
86
 In some instances, payment to the IOC is in 
the form of a priority to purchase the resulting oil at a discounted rate, as 
opposed to having a share in the profit, which would occur with a typical 
PSC. Under this model, if the project is only financed by the IOC on a 
service-basis, absent capital investment from Turkmenistan or Turkemngaz, 
the IOC becomes the sole bearer of financial risk in the event that the 
project is not profitable. Considering this, many observers believe the 
Turkmen model for natural gas production poses unfavourable finance and 
market conditions that deter IOCs, meaning the TCP cannot be realised.
87
 
A. Prior and Current Contractual and Financial Models for Constructing 
the TCP 
It was recently observed that Turkmenistan does not need to enter into 
PSCs to develop the TCP.
88
 Rather, investment may be sufficiently 
provided by the EU through an ‘independent carrier’ model. This requires 
initial capital to execute studies and obtain permits, which has already 
commenced, as mentioned above.
89
 To understand how this conclusion was 
reached, the three key attempts at developing the TCP need to be explored. 
The first attempt at development began in the late 1990s, when 
Turkmenistan, along with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia concluded 
agreements for the project at an Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development meeting in Istanbul.
90
 It was hopeful that the TCP would 
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be the eastward phase of the South Caucasus gas corridor. President 
Niyazov stalled talks with Turkey because he insisted on leading the 
negotiations and production without the necessary experience, which led to 
the agreements never being realised.
91
 Azerbaijan’s natural gas discoveries 
at the time and the disputed legal status of the Caspian Sea, outlined above, 
only further added to the complexity of getting construction of the TCP 
started.  
The second attempt occurred in conjunction with the White Stream 
pipeline project, which was later integrated with the EU’s SGC program, 
announced in 2009. The EU and the World Bank commissioned a study for 
a Caspian Development Corporation, to become the sole purchaser of 
Turkmenistan’s gas to aid in facilitating planning for the project, however, 
this study was unable to respond to Turkmenistan’s need for economies of 
scale at export quantities.
92
 This gave rise to the ‘two-entry points’ idea for 
Turkmen gas to enter European markets, which now forms part of the third, 
and currently ongoing, attempt. The first entry point is through the SGC via 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, with the second to travel through existing 
infrastructures under the Black Sea from Georgia to Romania.
93
  
While the restriction on IOC onshore investment remains during this 
third major attempt, constructing the TCP will not require Turkmenistan to 
enter into a PSC with foreign entities. Turkmenistan has already developed 
its abundant gas deposits in the east, and the East-West Pipeline (‘EWP’) 
for transmitting the gas to Turkmenistan’s border has already been 
constructed. The EWP is now capped, awaiting connection across the sea 
by way of the TCP.
94
 Additionally, the TCP itself will be built and operated 
by a pipeline company that is not owned by gas producers, following a 
standard industry business and financing model. This means that an 
‘independent carrier’ will execute the technical studies leading to sales-
purchase agreements between European buyers and Turkmenistan.
95
 The 
‘independent carrier’ model has provided a viable way to overcome any 
requirement for a PSC that secures onshore development, therefore making 
it likely that the TCP will be built.  
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B. Cooperation Between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan  
While foreign investment is necessary for constructing the TCP, and 
PGB has endeavoured to attract this,
96
 so too is cooperation between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. For Turkmenistan’s gas to reach European 
markets via the TCP, it is necessary that the pipeline integrate with 
Azerbaijan’s pipeline infrastructure. However, their relationship has been 
marred with conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union, subsequently 
delaying construction. Central to their dispute was how to divide their 
maritime borders, and in turn, determine ownership of three petroleum rich 
sections: Azeri/Khazar-Omar, Chirag/Osman, and Kyapaz/Serdar in 
Azerbaijani and Turkmen, respectively.
97
 British Petroleum (‘BP’) has 
already developed the first two fields after signing contracts with 
Azerbaijan,
98
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Diplomatic tensions between the two States reached a high point in 2001, 
when Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were in talks with the other littoral 
States to determine the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Khalaf Khalafov, 
chairman of the Azerbaijan delegation and deputy minister of Foreign 
Affairs, promoted drawing a median line according to the points of 
equidistance and stated this would be consistent with international law.
101
 
Conversely, Turkmenistan’s delegate advocated for the principle of 
granting a 20 per cent division,
102
 which is inconsistent with its later 
preference of having UNCLOS apply in determining the delineation of 
maritime zones.
103
 At the close of discussions, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkmenistan published an official note stating that “such a 
position of Azerbaijan, not considering the necessity of developing a 
mutually acceptable solution, brings the process of talks to a dead end” and 
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called on Azerbaijan to “stop all work related to the exploration and 
extraction of hydrocarbons as well as seismic explorations in the deposits of 
hydrocarbons located in the disputable areas… until the matter of defining 
the middle line is settled”.
104
 Turkmenistan then closed its embassy to 
Azerbaijan, and warned it would take their disagreement to the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague.
105
  
Thereafter, both States engaged in an undeclared ‘arms race’, militarising 
their respective territorial waters of the Caspian Sea, instilling concern that 
a legal regime for the waters could never be agreed upon.
106
 Wikileaks 
documents revealed that on two occasions in 2008, Azerbaijani gunboats 
threatened IOC ships working on behalf of Turkmenistan in the disputed 
zones.
107
 On the first occasion, Malaysian company Petronas, operating on 
contract with Turkmenistan, was allegedly working too close to 
Azerbaijan’s maritime zone. During this incident, PGB claimed he had been 
personally insulted by his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyez, and stated 
Aliyez was “running like a little boy” and engaging in “hooliganism”.
108
 
On the second occasion, Azeri gunboats intercepted a vessel that Canadian 
company, Buried Hill, had hired to perform research around the 
Serdar/Kyapaz and Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli maritime oil fields. However, 
BP, who was working on the Azeri side, was allegedly drilling diagonally 
into Turkmenistan’s zone, further fueling their dispute.
109
 Not only did this 
negatively impact upon negotiations pertaining to the Convention, it also 
hindered efforts to construct the TCP, serving Russia’s obstructionist 
position.  
Despite tensions escalating between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, they, 
along with the other Caspian littoral States, continued negotiations to 
attribute a legal status to the Caspian waters, and as explored earlier, were 
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successful in finalising this in 2018. The approval mechanism for laying 
submarine pipelines is groundbreaking for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan 
alike. Moreover, the Convention established a framework or future bilateral 
talks, but terms for border delimitation remain subject to agreement 
between States with adjacent and opposite coasts, with due regard to the 
generally recognised principles and norms of international law (which has 
been considered one of the Convention’s failings).
110
 As such, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan must still divide their common maritime 
border and determine ownership of the Kyapaz/Serdar field through a 
bilateral agreement.  
Remarkably, on 21 January 2021 the presidents of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’), for joint 
exploration of the Kyapaz/Serdar hydrocarbon field.
111
 They renamed the 
field ‘Dostluk’ or ‘Donstlug’, meaning friendship in their respective 
languages, which highlights just how far relations have come between the 
two. While an MoU is not legally binding, Azerbaijan’s Milli Medzhilis 
and Turkmenistan’s Mejlis, have both ratified the agreement.
112
 More 
significant than this new source of new revenue for the States given low 
natural-gas prices in 2021, is the indication of an intention to establish a 
dialogue for the TCP.
113
 As previously mentioned, cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is pertinent for realisation of the project. This 
warming of relations demonstrates cooperation on both sides, and will 
likely secure investor confidence in the region for IOCs and the EU.  
IV. Conclusion 
It is a critical moment in time for advancing construction of the TCP. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, laying submarine pipelines across 
the Caspian seabed was stymied by uncertainty concerning the legal status 
of the waters. The Convention has now settled this long-standing issue and 
presents an opportunity for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to embrace the 
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newly eased approval requirements for laying submarine pipelines. Russia 
and Iran have raised environmental concerns with the TCP, casting doubt 
over whether the pipeline can be built. However, this will likely be 
overcome by EU investment and the European Commission’s 
environmental scoping study, which concluded there were no major 
concerns. Even if environmental issues were to arise, the Convention 
requires the littoral States to cooperate, and industry best-practices could 
guide completion of the TCP.
114
  
Concerns about PGB’s restrictive policies toward onshore field 
development can also be assuaged, as Turkmenistan does not need to enter 
into PSCs to develop the TCP. Rather, investment may be sufficiently 
provided through an ‘independent carrier’ model.
115
 Nevertheless, 
Turkmenistan’s ‘Era of Might and Happiness’ centres on the nation’s 
ability to diversify its natural gas exports and increase demand, and 
therefore its cooperation with the EU can be expected. The remaining issue 
is whether current low natural-gas prices can justify development costs. 
Given the political and economic backing behind the TCP, this article 
firmly believes it can. 
                                                                                                             
 114. Cutler, supra note 63.  
 115. Id. 
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